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FOUNDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ECONOMIC INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN
THE ARCTIC OCEAN IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL
WARMING
Karl Fisher1
Abstract
The United States’ sustained economic and geopolitical interest in
the Arctic is dependent on Congressional funding and Executive
support for icebreaking vessels and improved infrastructure in
United States arctic territory. The United States has an interest in the
Arctic and it is demonstrated by The Arctic Research and Policy Act
of 1984 (amended 1990). Through the Act, the United States
initiated research and policy development, with the supposition of
potential economic benefits in the future. Due to verifiable and
anticipated changes in ice density in the Arctic, the region is
accessible like never before, and international competition for
natural resources and commercial shipping lanes in the Arctic offer
enormous economic benefits. The United States is woefully behind
its international competitors due to a small and decrepit fleet of
icebreaking vessels and crumbling arctic infrastructure. In
examining The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 and multiple
Arctic Strategy Plans that were published by federal agencies
operating in the Arctic, it is clear —attention from Congress and the
Executive must be redirected towards advancement. The first step
to advancing the United States interest in the Arctic is by funding
and procuring icebreaking vessels and improving arctic territory
infrastructure.
“The nature of maritime activity in the Arctic is indeed evolving
from exploration and scientific research to resource extraction,
commercial shipping, and a broad array of other pursuits.”2

1
2

J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2020.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Transpolar Passage, Northwest Passage (NWP), and
Northeast Passage, also known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR),
are oceanic waterways that traverse the Arctic Ocean. 3 These Arctic
maritime routes are affected by the global trend in warming
temperatures, which is likely to continue for decades, consequently
reducing ice coverage. 4 Although predictions vary with respect to
how soon Arctic waters will be ice-free, researchers agree that
between the years 2050 and 2060, ice coverage will be significantly
reduced to the extent that commercial shipping lanes will be more
accessible and navigable. 5 Transnational commercial shipping
through Arctic maritime routes will become viable alternatives to
current Panama and Suez Canal routes. 6 The distance from source
to terminal will be materially shorter, 7 and the channels deeper,
thereby accommodating ships of greater storage capacity. In
addition, huge quantities of oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids,
together with the world’s largest deposits of nickel, coal and zinc,
are in the Arctic seabed and will become accessible for extraction. 8
Malte Humpert, The Future of the Northern Sea Route- A “Golden Waterway”
or a Niche Trade Route, The Arctic Inst. (Sep. 15, 2011),
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-northern-sea-route-golden-waterwayniche/, [https://perma.cc/AB9U-LJAR]; See also Appendix 1.
4 Scott R. Stephenson & Laurence C. Smith, Influence of Climate Model
Variability on Projected Arctic Shipping Futures, 3 Earth’s Future 331, 331
(2015),
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2015EF000317,
[https://perma.cc/RG4G-CKTS]; Jugal K. Patel & Henry Fountain, As Arctic Ice
Vanishes, New Shipping Routes Open, N.Y. Times (May 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/03/science/earth/arcticshipping.html, [https://perma.cc/63VS-TQ67]; Garret W. Brass, U.S. ARCTIC
RESEARCH COMM’N, THE ARCTIC OCEAN AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
A SCENARIO FOR THE U.S. NAVY 1 (2002).
5 See generally Stephenson & Smith supra note 3 at 331; see also Patel &
Fountain, supra note 3; see also U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, supra
note 3 at 1.
6 Huiru Liu, Arctic Marine Insurance: Towards a New Risk Coverage Regiment,
47 J. Mar. L. & Com. 77, 77 (2016); Alexander Proelss & Till Müller, The Legal
Regime of the Arctic Ocean, 68 Heidelberg J. Int’l L. 651, 653 (2008).
7 Liu, supra note 5, at 77.
8 James Kraska, From Pariah To Partner—Russian-American Security
Cooperation in the Arctic Ocean, 16 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 517, 523 (2010).
3
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The relationship between the Arctic region and the U.S.
arose, in many ways, from an initial interest in establishing and
cultivating U.S. presence and interest in the Arctic through research
and policy development, with the supposition of potential economic
benefits in the future. 9 This intent was codified in The Arctic
Research and Policy Act of 1984 (amended 1990) (hereinafter
referred to as the “Act”). When the Act was proposed in the mid
1980’s, the extent to which the Arctic would be impacted by global
warming was, for the most part, unaccounted for by Congress.
Today, there is significant research to substantiate the effects of
global warming in the Arctic.10 As a result, the data from which
Congress acted upon when drafting the Act is much different than
what Congress knows now. Due to anticipated changes in ice
density in the Arctic and the affect it will have on commercial
activity in the Arctic region, the continued efficacy of the Act
depends on two factors. First, Congress should ensure that the three
icebreaking vessels planned for construction are built on schedule,11
and they should also begin the processes of procuring additional
icebreakers. Second, Congress, along with administrative agencies,
and the States of Alaska and Maine, should work collaboratively to
construct new and improved infrastructure to accommodate the
anticipated commercial activity in the Arctic region. 12

S. REP. NO. 98-159, at 2 (1983) (Conf. Rep.)
Charles H. Norchi & Paul A. Mayewski, The Arctic: Science, Law, and
Policy, 22 The Ocean and Coastal L. J. 97, 100 (2017).
11 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-600,
COAST GUARD ACQUISITIONS POLAR ICEBREAKER PROGRAM
NEEDS TO ADDRESS RISKS BEFORE COMMITTING RESOURCES
(2018).
12 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON THE GOALS AND
OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH 2017-2018 FOR THE U.S. ARCTIC
RESEARCH PROGRAMM PLAN 8 (2017),
https://storage.googleapis.com/arcticgovstatic/publications/goals/usarc_goals_2017-2018_version_2.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/5T8X-U99V] (Infrastructure includes “ports, harbors, and
places of refuge, aids to navigation, systems for search and rescue and for spill
response, ice navigation training, navigation charts, communication systems,
icebreakers, and ice centers.”).
9

10
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Without additional vessels and infrastructure improvements,
U.S. activity in the Arctic, and consequently, any interest the U.S.
intended to gain in the Arctic economy, will be severely impaired.
The following sections expand on this assertion. The beginning
section examines the increasing financial and geopolitical
opportunities in the Arctic region. Any U.S. interest in the Arctic
economy is already in direct competition with other world powers;
therefore, attention from Congress and the Executive must be
redirected towards advancement. The next section analyzes the Act
and its accompanying research and policy, which, at this point, is no
longer sufficient to properly compete on a world-scale. While
research and policy were significant components to the U.S. interest
in the Arctic during the mid-1980s and early 1990s, it is clear that
that will not create economic advancement. The next step to U.S.
economic advancement in the Arctic is in the form of new
icebreaking vessels and improved Arctic infrastructure. The final
section addresses the, albeit, costly process for acquiring and
initiating this development. While policy and research are
important, we are moving into an era of documented and visible
changes. The U.S. must effectively participate in the Arctic
economy and the manner in which to begin is by constructing
icebreaking vessels and Arctic infrastructure.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN &
COMMCERCIAL SHIPPING
The Arctic Ocean is strategically important to the world for
at least three reasons. First, the passageways (Transpolar, NWP, and
NSR) that flow through the Arctic Ocean connect the eastern and
western hemispheres;13 second, the natural resources located within
the Arctic seabed are abundant; 14 third, the region offers financial
and geopolitical advantages to nations or private entities within
those nations that can best leverage the shipping channels and
natural resources of the Arctic. The three important elements are
discussed in the following section.

13
14

See Appendix 1.
Kraska, supra note 7, at 523.
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The NWP runs above Canada, the NSR runs above Russia,
and the Transpolar Sea Route runs directly through the center of the
Arctic Ocean.15 The countries that have territory within the Arctic
Circle include Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Norway, Russia,
and the United States via Alaska. 16 While not central to this
comment, there are multiples legal disputes among Arctic countries
that stem from claims of territorial ownership within Arctic waters. 17
These unsettled conflicts exacerbates the geopolitical complexities
that surround the Arctic region and the sovereign Arctic border
countries because territorial ownership equates to exclusive control
and use of resources therein. The governing law regarding the
Arctic Ocean derives from the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although UNCLOS has not been
ratified by the U.S., the U.S. does recognize international customary
law.18 Customary law is essentially a tenant of international law and
is a result of consistent practices of nation states which influences
conduct and behavior due a sense of legal obligation to coordinate
uniform behavior.19 As the U.S. Navy noted, despite not having
ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. has a sense of obligation to conform to
the rules that pertain to territoriality of the seas, which are defined
therein.20 Territorial seas are important to the countries that border
the Arctic because, under UNCLOS, a territorial sea “basically
functions as a continuation of the country’s land territory[,]”
essentially affording full sovereignty. 21 However, UNCLOS
codifies the right of innocent passage for all ships to travel through
the territorial seas of a coastal state so long as it is “peaceful,

Id; Humpert, supra note 2.
Stephanie Holmes, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic
Sovereignty, 9 Chicago J. of Int’l L. 323, 326 (2008).
17 See generally Proelss & Müller, supra note 5, at 655.
18 Navy Task Force Climate Change, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 3,
13 (2014).
19 Customary Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
20 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part II § 1-2 art. 2-3,
Dec. 10, 1982 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
21 Holmes, supra note 14, at 326.
15
16
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continuous, and expedient.”22 Those nations that may eventually
gain exclusive control of additional territory in the Arctic, or the
private entities of those nations, will likely realize benefits in the
Arctic economy.
B.

The Arctic Economy

The Arctic economy is comprised of an abundance of natural
resources, the commercial benefits and cost savings of maritime
Arctic commerce, and foreign investment by countries like China
and Russia, which have already begun to invest in the Arctic’s
future.23
1.

Natural Resources

The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that “the Arctic holds
about thirteen (13) percent of the world’s undiscovered oil, thirty
(30) percent of the undiscovered natural gas and twenty (20) percent
of the undiscovered natural gas liquids.” 24 That is approximately
ninety (90) billion barrels of oil and forty-seven (47) trillion cubic
meters of natural gas. 25 The Arctic seabed also contains some of the

Id. at 334. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, at Part II § 3 art. 17-19. See generally
Ed Struzik, Full Speed Ahead Shipping Plans Grow as Arctic Ice Fades, YALE
360 (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/cargo_shipping_in_the_arctic_declining_sea_ice,
[https://perma.cc/TT8M-N27F]; Caitlin O’Leary, Note/Comment, The New Ice
Age: The Dawn of the Arctic Shipping and Canada’s Fight for Sovereignty over
the Northwest Passage, 46 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 117, 119-20 (20142015) (Russia, due to its geography, has an advantageous claim to territory in
the Northeast Passage which gives it greater exclusive control over the NSR.
While Canada claims the NWP as its sovereign territory, it is contested by the
U.S. and China, which argue the NWP is an international strait. This debate is
beyond the scope of this comment, but helpful when thinking about the
geopolitics of the Arctic region that stem from territorial disputes.).
23 Proelss & Müller, supra note 5, at 653; Clay Dillow, Russia and China vie to
Beat the U.S. in the Trillion-Dollar Race to Control the Arctic, CNBC (Feb. 6,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/russia-and-china-battle-us-in-race-tocontrol-arctic.html, [https://perma.cc/FC89-37CE].
24 Kraska, supra note 7, at 523; Frank Ulmer, Alaska and the Arctic, 31 Alaska
L. Rev. 161, 163 (2014).
25 Kraska, supra note 7, at 523.
22
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world’s largest nickel, coal, and zinc deposits.26 In addition to
natural minerals, the Arctic region also offers a fishing economy that
will also develop as ice density is reduced. 27 The natural
commodities located in the Arctic are substantial to say the least.
2.

Commercial Shipping

The driving forces of the Arctic economy can be attributed
not only to its natural resources,28 but also to its geography, which
lends itself to advantageous commercial shipping because of shorter
and deep water shipping routes by way of the NWP, NSR, and
Transpolar Passage.29 Approximately ninety percent of all goods are
shipped by sea.30 That is because shipping is “the cheapest form of
transport[,]” and there is no indication that that will change in the
near future.31 Moreover, because the “vast majority of active
industrial production in the world . . . is concentrated . . . north of
the [thirtieth] parallel[,] and about [seventy percent] of the world’s
urban metropolitan areas are located north of the [twenty-third]
parallel in the northern hemisphere[,]” the Arctic region is wellsituated to advance the world’s supply and demand chain. 32
Illustrative of the economy of shipping in the Arctic is the
case of the Nordic Orion, which, in 2013, was the first commercial
bulk carrier to sale through the Northwest Passage. 33 By traveling
Kraska, supra note 7, at 523; Dillow, supra note 21 (“[A] range of mineable
minerals, including gold, silver, diamond, copper, titanium, graphite, uranium
and other valuable rare earth elements” are “increasingly within reach” as ice
melts).
27 U.S. Artic Research Comm’n, supra note 3, at 1, 5.
28 Dillow, supra note 21 (“The ultimate goal: to have offshore Arctic oil account
for between 20 and 30 percent of Russian production by 2050.”).
29 Id. See also Liu, supra note 5, at 77.
30 Bruce G. Paulsen, What the General Litigator Needs to Know about Handling
a Maritime Case, 41 Litigation J. 1, 1 (2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_journal/sp
ring2015/handling-maritime-cases.authcheckdam.pdf, [https://perma.cc/284JB2Q8].
31 Id.
32 Liu, supra note 5, at 77.
33 Wendy Stueck, Groundbreaking Northwest Passage voyage almost foundered
over insurance, The Globe and Mail
26
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through the Northwest Passage, as opposed to the Panama Canal,
the Nordic Orion saved eighty thousand dollars in fuel cost, traveled
one thousand nautical miles less, and the ship could carry about
twenty-five percent more coal because the water was not as shallow
as the Panama Canal. 34 The Northwest Passage proved to be both
advantageous and cost-effective.
3.

Investing Countries

As previously noted, Russia and China are beating “the U.S.
in the [t]rillion-[d]ollar [r]ace to [c]ontrol the Arctic,”. 35 Despite
significant investment by other countries, such as Canada and some
Nordic countries, Russia and China are the clear leaders. 36 Russia
has conducted commercial Arctic shipping since the first half of the
twentieth century through the NSR as a way of connecting Russia’s
isolated north to the rest of the country. 37 Now, the NSR is
“experiencing a renaissance.” 38 This is in part because of China,
which predicted that fifteen percent of its “annual trade would travel
along Russia’s Northern Sea Route by 2020.” 39 Given China’s
rhetoric,40 and the fact that it is currently constructing an icebreaking
vessel,41 there is no doubt that China will utilize the NSR.

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/groundbreakingnorthern-voyage-almost-foundered-over-insurance/article14649393/,
[https://perma.cc/DV4P-G4VX] (last updated May, 11, 2018).
34 Id.
35 Dillow, supra note 21.
36 Ásgeir Sigfússon, Getting into the Game: America’s Arctic Diplomacy, The
Foreign Serv. J. Nov. 2015,
http://www.afsa.org/sites/default/files/flipping_book/1115/files/assets/basichtml/page-23.html, [https://perma.cc/4BSA-EPJ3].
37 Kraska, supra note 7, at 529.
38 Id.
39 Ryan Kilpatrick, China’s Plan for the Arctic—And A Shipping Centre to Rival
Singapore, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/business/article/2046117/chinas-plan-arcticand-shipping-centre-rival-singapore, [https://perma.cc/NLD3-HHDT].
40 Id
41 U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY, MAJOR
ICEBREAKERS OF THE WORLD (2017) [https://perma.cc/3VKJ-4NK2].
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Despite China’s investment, which includes the new
icebreaker, Russia is the world leader in icebreaker capability and
subsequently, access to the Arctic Ocean. 42 In Russia, icebreakers
are used for many purposes, one of which is commercial. Russia has
a fleet large enough “to reliably escort other [ships] through still
periodically frozen waters, and that gives it massive influence over
regional shipping patterns.”43 Russia also installed and revitalized
ports along its NSR.44 In fact, Russia invested three hundred billion
dollars “in potential projects either completed, in motion or
proposed, [which makes] Russia . . . the clear leader in Arctic
infrastructure development.”45
China, even without a territorial claim in the Arctic, is also
heavily invested in the Arctic Ocean’s economic future. China’s
president, Xi Jingping, announced China’s “ambitions to develop a
‘Polar Silk Road’ through the region as warming global
temperatures open up new sea lanes and economic opportunities at
the top of the world.”46 China is using its economic strength to
influence the region by “underwriting Arctic development
projects.”47 Xi Jingping’s rhetoric indicates that China has “a keen
interest in what the Arctic has to offer in terms of global shipping,
fishing stocks, energy security and other mineral resources.”48 By
incorporating the Arctic into their Belt and Road initiative, the
Chinese government has taken “what is arguably the longest view
in the region, using its financial might to secure access to resources
it cannot obtain through territorial claims.” 49
See U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY, MAJOR
ICEBREAKERS OF THE WORLD (2017) [https://perma.cc/3VKJ-4NK2];
Kraska, supra note 7, at 529.
43 Peter Apps, Commentary: The U.S. Risks Losing an Arctic Cold War, Reuters
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://in.reuters.com/article/us-apps-arcticcommentary/commentary-the-us-risks-losing-an-arctic-cold-waridINKBN1FJ2DM, [https://perma.cc/93DH-VDKC].
44 Sigfússon, supra note 34; Dillow, supra note 21.
42

Dillow, supra note 21.
Id.; Struzki, supra 20, at 2.
47 Dillow, supra note 21.
48 Id.
49 Id.
45
46
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Based upon aforementioned developments in the Arctic
region, the Arctic is a focus of financial investment and anticipated
returns.50 The Arctic Ocean is poised for a flurry of new activity in
the coming decades because natural resources, which were not
available thirty to forty years ago, can now be extracted; 51
additionally, commercial shipping and international competition are
at the forefront of the Arctic economy in a manner that is drastically
different than when the Act was passed. As one of the great nations
of the world, the U.S. should have a significant role in the Arctic. 52
The economic prospects offered in the Arctic should encourage
Congress to advance U.S. interest in the Arctic economy. This is
especially true because increasing commercial activity will only
strain the already minimal resources the U.S. has available in the
Arctic.53

Id. (“An inventory of planned, in-progress, completed, or canceled Arctic
infrastructure projects compiled by global financial firm Guggenheim Partners
tallies roughly 900 projects, requiring a total of $ 1trillion in investment, some
of which is already on the way.”).
51 Proelss & Müller, supra note 5, at 653; Ulmer, supra note 22 at 163 (“fishing .
. . or oil and gas”).
52 Ulmer, supra note 22, at 161(While outside the scope of this comment, but
somewhat related to economic advancement, the U.S. should be concerned
about mitigating risk in the Arctic region. Insurance management for Arctic
shipping is another reason for the U.S. to be involved in the Arctic region,
especially because regional economies in states like Alaska and Maine could be
impacted by oil spills; See Liu, supra note 5, at 78 (“The Arctic is full of risks . .
. Risk distribution among ships and shipowners is a key factor in the economic
sustainability of world shipping.”); Struzik, supra note 20 (State economies, like
that of Maine, which, due to its location, stand to benefit from Arctic sipping
because it is the first port on the U.S. East Coast for ships traveling the shorter
route from Asia to Europe. By using the Arctic Ocean, ships could save about
ten days. Maine is in the process of improving its port, which is already home to
Icelandic shipping company, Eimskip).
53 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON THE GOALS AND
OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH 2017-2018 FOR THE U.S. ARCTIC
RESEARCH PROGRAM PLAN 8, 15 (2017).
https://storage.googleapis.com/arcticgovstatic/publications/goals/usarc_goals_2017-2018_version_2.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/ESA2-5JCP] (“U.S. vessels are aging and dwindling in number
. . . Only one heavy icebreaker, USCG Polar Star, commissioned [forty] years
ago, remains operational. USCG Healy, a medium icebreaker commissioned in
50
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Before the Act came to fruition, Congress intended to create
a comprehensive:
national Arctic research policy in concert with a sustained
research effort [to] allow the Nation to continue to develop
the vast renewable and nonrenewable resources of the Arctic
in an expeditious but responsible manner. A comprehensive
Arctic research policy and a sustained research effort is also
important to stated U.S. national security objectives . . .
Research is important to the responsible development of
Arctic resources, the meeting of important national security
objectives, and the creation of a broad data base helpful to
the resolution of a wide variety of current and future
problems.54
The Act envisioned a sustainable long-term approach to the
Arctic region through research, data collection, and policy
development. Now is the time for Congress to capitalize on these
earlier efforts and recognize that the U.S. has an interest in the
financial and geopolitical advancement of the Arctic region.
However, without icebreaking vessels and improved infrastructure,
the goals set out in the Act, which harken to sustainability and
mitigation of long-term challenges, will not be achieved. The Act
even acknowledges that the U.S. is inadequately equipped compared
to other Arctic nations. 55 While it was urgent for Congress to enact
legislation pertaining to the Arctic in 1984, it is considerably more
urgent that Congress reinvigorate U.S. interest in the Arctic.
III. THE ARCTIC RESEARCH AND POLICY ACT OF 1984 (AMENDED
1990)
The purpose of the Act, among other things, is to delineate
policy initiatives,56 centralize research and data collection, 57 and
1999, continues to operate successfully in the Arctic, effectively supporting a
broad range of scientific missions.”).
54 S. REP. NO. 98-159, at 2 (1983) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
55 15 U.S.C. § 4101(a)(10) (“most Arctic-rim countries possess Arctic
technologies far more advanced than those currently available in the United
States[.]”).
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 4101-11.
57 S. REP. NO. 98-159, supra note 52, at 14.
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promote burden sharing in order to have more sustainable long-term
development.58 The Act delineates several reasons for which Arctic
interest is important, including the Arctic’s onshore and offshore
energy resources; national defense; commercial assets; “security[;]
economic[;] and environmental interests.” 59 Essentially, the Act
identifies the financial and geopolitical significance of the Arctic
region.
The import of the Act is belied in the collective efforts of
federal agencies working toward a common interest of research and
policy in the Arctic. The Act sets-out objectives for many U.S.
agencies that operate in the Arctic. 60 The Act established
information sharing processes and collaboration through “an Arctic
Research Commission [that] promote[s] [and recommends] Arctic
research and . . . policy . . . [and] an Interagency Arctic Research
Policy Committee [led by the National Science Foundation] to
develop a national Arctic research policy and a five year plan to
implement that policy.”61 The Act was followed by an Executive
Order signed by president Reagan that aligned the executive’s
interest in the Arctic with the legislature’s interest. 62
As prescribed by the Act, the Interagency Committee’s fiveyear plan is the result of a collaborative effort made by the many
agencies which function within the Arctic. 63 The Plan is a tangible
deliverable that is prepared for Congress and the Executive so that
together, the U.S. government may continuously prepare future
plans for U.S. involvement in the Arctic, which should now include
See generally Id. at 2-20.
15 U.S.C. § 4101(a)(1)-(3), (9).
60 15 U.S.C. § 4106(b)(2)(A)-(L).. (The Interagency Committee is comprised of
the National Science Foundation; The Departments of Commerce, Defense,
Energy, the Interior, State, Transportation, and Health and Human Services; The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Environmental Protection
Agency; Office of Science and Technology Policy; and “any other Executive
agency that the Director of the National Science Foundation shall deem
appropriate.”); see also Proclamation No. 12501, 50 Fed. Reg. 4191 (Jan. 28,
1985).
61 15 U.S.C. § 4101(b)(1)-(3)
62 Proclamation No. 12501, 50 Fed. Reg. 4191 (Jan. 28, 1985) (The purpose was
to “develop and recommend an integrated national Arctic research policy.”).
63 See supra note 56; 15 U.S.C. § 4106(b)(2)(A)-(L).
58
59
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an adequate fleet of icebreaking vessels and adequate infrastructure
and personnel to service the increasing Arctic activity.
Icebreaking vessels and port development serve two
purposes that pertain to the Act and its reason for being. First, they
allow the agencies who have congressionally defined duties to
physically operate in the Arctic. The policies and data collected
from those operations are incorporated into the Interagency Plan,
which informs Congress and the Executive. The second purpose is
to promote long-term development in the Arctic which can be
realized by icebreakers and port development because they afford
an opportunity to capitalize on both natural resources and maritime
commerce in the Arctic, which should promote long-term growth in
the region, if carried out sustainably.
While the next section addresses the Interagency Plan that
was created pursuant to the Act, the analysis does not lie in the
substance of what the goals are but rather how they can be achieved.
The Plan makes it clear that for research to continue and long-term
development plans to be achieved, icebreakers and port
development are critical to the operations of federal agencies in the
Arctic.
A.

Analyzing the Arctic Research Plan Fiscal Year 20172021

The most recent Arctic Plan comes at a time when the
climatic and commercial changes in the Arctic are imposing
challenges to federal agencies carrying out congressionally
mandated operations in the Arctic. 64 The Plan is a comprehensive
report built upon research and data collected by many federal
organizations from the Interagency Committee. 65 The current Plan
INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, ARCTIC RESEARCH PLAN FY20172021 i-ii (2016).
https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/uploads/cms/documents/iarpc_arctic_resear
ch_plan_2017-2021.pdf, [https://perma.cc/5Y72-AD8Q].
65 Id.at i-vi.
64
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identifies challenges, and poses steps to alleviate those barriers in
the form of goals, which are listed below.
•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•

•

66

Id. at 1.

Research Goal 1: Enhance understanding of health
determinants and improve the well-being of Arctic
residents.
Research Goal 2: Advance process and systems
understanding of the changing Arctic atmospheric
composition and dynamics and the resulting changes
to surface energy budgets.
Research Goal 3: Enhance understanding and
improve predictions of the changing Arctic sea ice
cover.
Research Goal 4: Increase understanding of the
structure and function of Arctic marine ecosystems
and their role in the climate system and advance
predictive capabilities.
Research Goal 5: Understand and project the mass
balance of glaciers, ice caps, and the Greenland ice
sheet and their consequences for sea level rise.
Research Goal 6: Advance understanding of process
controlling permafrost dynamics and the impacts on
ecosystems, infrastructure, and climate feedbacks.
Research Goal 7: Advance an integrated, landscapescale understanding of Arctic terrestrial and
freshwater ecosystems and the potential for future
change.
Research Goal 8: Strengthen coastal community
resilience and advances stewardship of coastal
natural and cultural resources by engaging in
research related to the interconnections of people,
natural, and built environments.
Research Goal 9: Enhance frameworks for
environmental intelligence gathering, interpretation,
and application toward decision support. 66
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If unable to satisfy these goals, Arctic operations may be
inhibited, which would limit sustained research and policy
development, essentially rendering the Act ineffective. The Act
highlights the importance of adapting in parallel to the identified
changes to allow agencies to continue operating effectively. In other
words, agencies must continuously adapt. An example of adaptation
is through vessel and infrastructure construction which will allow
for continued operations in the wake of new environmental
challenges, which are currently inhibiting long-term, sustained,
operations. Explicit in the Plan is that a “complete understanding of
the Arctic System must include the human component.” 67 Inherent
in the human component is the Arctic economy.
Each of the nine goals are affected by the increase in
commercialization and human activity. 68 The challenge in
accomplishing these goals and performance elements is exacerbated
by “commercial shipping, resource extraction and tourism[,]” which
come as a result of “diminishing sea ice.” 69 In fact, the ability to
meet the Plan’s goals is arguably contingent on icebreakers, which
are currently operating at reduced capacity in the U.S.,70 and port
development because as commercialization continues in the Arctic,
there will be continuous challenges that inhibit sustainable
development and long-term interest in the Arctic, which could leave
the U.S. in a state loss when compared to countries like Russia and
China.
The Plan finds that an effort to meet the challenges brought
on by commercialization is crucial because it directly impacts U.S.
territory.71 For instance, diminishing sea ice may impact the people
and the States of Alaska and Maine 72 because of their geographic
Id. at 4.
generally Id. at 4.
69 Id. at ii.
70; see also U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY,
MAJOR ICEBREAKERS OF THE WORLD (2017); NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, POLAR ICEBREAKERS IN A CHANGING WORLD 2 (2007).
71 INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, supra note 62, at 3, n.5 (“About 30
percent of Alaska lies within the Arctic Circle.”).
72 Struzik, supra note 20.
67

68See
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proximity to the Arctic. This could also mean, as discussed in the
prior section, “new opportunities for commercial and industrial
development”73 in the form of “increased ship traffic for cargo and
tourism.”74 The Plan’s goals recognize the challenges in the Arctic
that are arising from the changing environment and
commercialization of the region, and that infrastructure in the Arctic
is no longer suitable. 75 The challenges can be mitigated, however,
by managing and influencing the influx of Arctic maritime traffic
through research and policy, and by enabling greater access to the
Arctic Ocean to enable exploration and commercial shipping
traffic.76 The need for icebreaking vessels that can navigate the
Arctic Ocean in all conditions is necessary. Moreover, as U.S.
agencies begin to utilize new icebreakers to perform their
operations, and modern infrastructure is developed to accommodate
commercial activity in the harsh climate,77 more opportunity will be
available to utilize U.S. Arctic territory, and neighboring territory,
in ways that are similar to Russia. 78
The Plan essentially concludes that while research and
policy are key to its purpose, the “human component” in the Arctic
requires advancement in new resources, such as icebreakers and
infrastructure. Not only does the Plan support this notion, but so too
do the U.S. agencies who operate in the Arctic, each of which
developed their own Arctic plans that are unique to the prerogatives
of that agency. The following sub-sections analyze four independent
plans for the Arctic. The plans were produced by the U.S. Arctic
Research Commission, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense,
and the U.S. Coast Guard. Each of these organizations play an active
role in the Interagency Arctic Research Committee. The individual
plans permit us to better understand that each of these agencies

INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, supra note 62, at 8.
74 Id. at 19.
75 Id. at 33 (“permafrost warming, degradation, and thaw subsidence can have
significant implications for . . . infrastructure.”).
76 See generally id. at 19-20.
77 See generally id. at 33.
78 Apps, supra note 41; Kraska, supra note 7, at 529.
73
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contribute to the broader Plan and are interconnected by their Arctic
operations.
1.

The US. Arctic Research Commission Report 79

The role of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission is defined
in the Act.80 The Commission is “composed of seven members
appointed by the President, with the Director of the National Science
Foundation serving as a nonvoting, ex officio member.” 81
Membership includes four individuals with academic or research
expertise in the Arctic, one member who is an indigenous resident
of the Arctic, and two representatives from private interest groups. 82
The terms are limited to a maximum of four years and vacancies are
staggered,83 which allows for consistency between new and old
members. Additionally, representatives of federal agencies involved
in the Interagency Committee may be appointed to the Commission
as observers to “report . . . and advise the Commission on the
activities relating to Arctic research of their agencies.” 84 The
composition of the Commission leads to a multifaceted perspective,
which allows for comprehensive reports and recommendations. The
Commission makes recommendations through a report to Congress
and the President, as directed by the Act, and cooperates with the
State of Alaska to improve, facilitate, and manage the logistics of
disseminating research plans and information. 85 The Commission
may also collect data and reports from other agencies, and may
request assistance from the heads of the those agencies. All “Federal
agencies shall consult with the Commission before undertaking

U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON THE GOALS AND
OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH 2017-2018 FOR THE U.S. ARCTIC
RESEARCH PROGRAMM PLAN (2017),
https://storage.googleapis.com/arcticgovstatic/publications/goals/usarc_goals_2017-2018_version_2.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/F3L3-ZNEN].
80 15 U.S.C. § 4103.
81 15 U.S.C. § 4102(b)(1).
82 15 U.S.C. § 4102(b).
83 15 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(2)(A)-(C).
84 15 U.S.C. § 4102(d)(3).
85 15 U.S.C § 4103.
79
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major Federal actions relating to Arctic research.” 86 The
Commission, together with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy
Committee shall prepare and submit an Arctic research plan to the
President, who then transmits it to Congress.87 The plan “shall be
revised biennially.”88 While the Commission significantly
contributes to the Plan, the Commission also produces its own
Arctic report.
The Commission’s report is centered on the economic
impact of the changing Arctic Ocean, and possible strategies that
can be employed to induce positive environmental, ecological, and
financial outcomes. 89 In one regard, the report concludes that the
Arctic is changing and the U.S. needs to engage in the Arctic in
parallel with that change. 90 a second conclusion is that because the
Arctic is “rapidly and dramatically changing,” 91 there are new
challenges that are identified as potential barriers to effectuating
effective research and policy initiatives. A base-level solution to
dealing with the change is to ensure icebreakers and infrastructure
are developed.92
The report identified several challenges that specifically
implicate port infrastructure and access to the Arctic Ocean by
means of icebreaking vessels. The report found that “[c]ompromised
infrastructure increases risks to human health, safety, and well-being
and results in economic impacts on the scale of billions of dollars in
Alaska alone.”93 The Commission refers to this type of
15 U.S.C. § 41014 (c).
15 U.S.C. § 4108.
88 15 U.S.C. § 4108.
89 See generally U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 77 at 1-16.
90 Id. at 1.
[T]he Arctic region is rapidly and dramatically changing, redefining
life for people and communities, animals and plants, ecosystem
functions, and landscapes. The present doesn’t look like the past, and
the future will not look like the present, which makes it challenging for
people to make choices about managing development and
transportation, as well as land and water uses.
91 Id.
86
87

92
93

Id. at 8, 15.
Id. at 8.
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infrastructure as a “built environment,” (i.e. “a social science term
that refers to the human-made surroundings and infrastructure that
provide the setting for human activity, ranging in scale from
buildings to cities and including supporting systems . . . for water,
sewage, energy, communications, and transportation.”) 94
Considering all of the variables and requirements that are expected
to ripple out from the increased commercial activity in the Arctic
Ocean, updated and increased infrastructure is necessary if the U.S.
is to accommodate commercial shipping in the Arctic region. If
unable to accommodate the challenges, the U.S. will fail to realize
the monetary benefits that narrowly accompany such
accommodation.95
The Commission also identified several ways that the U.S.
can support increasing maritime commerce in the Arctic, which
includes implementation and enforcement of the International
Maritime Organization’s Polar Code. 96 Another way is to develop
“adequate infrastructure, such as ports, harbors, and places of
refuge, aids to navigation, systems for search and rescue and for spill
response, ice navigation training, navigation charts, communication
systems, icebreakers, and ice centers.” 97 The U.S. icebreaking fleet
and port infrastructure is currently undersized and outdated. 98 A
correlation with the lack of icebreaking vessels is perhaps an
Id.
Consider the earlier discussion regarding the advances that Russia has
undertaken in the Arctic compared to those of the U.S. As the Arctic Ocean
continues to experience reduced ice-coverage, the NWP and Transpolar Passage
will be utilized more in Arctic shipping regimes, thus competing with Russia’s
NSR, which is currently utilized more than other Arctic shipping routes because
there is less ice coverage for longer periods of time. Russia is developing and
revitalizing its own infrastructure to capitalize on the Arctic economy. As the
Commission’s plan noted, new environmental challenges will expose outdated
infrastructure.
96 THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, ARCTIC STRATEGY 17 (2013).
97 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 77, at 8.
98 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON THE GOALS AND
OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH 2017-2018 FOR THE U.S. ARCTIC
RESEARCH PROGRAMM PLAN 15 (2017) (“U.S. vessels are aging and
dwindling in number . . . Only one heavy icebreaker, USCG Polar Star,
commissioned [forty] years ago, remains operational. USCG Healy, a medium
icebreaker commissioned in 1999, continues to operate successfully in the
Arctic, effectively supporting a broad range of scientific missions.”).
94
95
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explanation as to why there is inadequate mapping of the Arctic
Ocean region. In fact, “less than [five percent] of U.S. Arctic
maritime waters (those within [two hundred] nautical miles of
Alaska shorelines in the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas) have
been mapped by modern methods.”99 Additionally, “[i]cebreaking
vessels are essential to conducting world-class research in the Arctic
Ocean. Without that capacity, the ability to answer challenging
scientific questions becomes impossible.” 100 The need for
icebreakers and improved infrastructure is readily apparent to the
Arctic Commission. The Commission also recognized that “the time
required to design, build, and commission a vessel can take years, if
not a decade.”101 This makes the timing of procuring these vessels
even more crucial.
The Commission identified the importance of revitalized
infrastructure and icebreaking vessels as significant components to
enhancing economic and human opportunities in the Arctic. The
Commission’s efficacy is also dependent on these improvements
because without improved infrastructure and icebreakers, the
statutorily defined duties of the Commission become increasingly
difficult to achieve.102 While the Commission’s report was prepared
for, and utilized by, other actors with Arctic interests, the
Commission has legally binding responsibilities. Without improved
infrastructure and icebreaking vessels, the commission cannot carry
out its duties and the Act becomes ineffective. the purpose of the
Commission and the Act are likely to be ineffective. The next
section examines the challenges the Arctic poses to the U.S. Navy’s
duties in the Arctic, and the ways in which icebreakers and
infrastructure can mitigate those challenges.
2.

The U.S. Navy Arctic Plan (2014-2030)

The Navy, which is organized under the Department of
Defense (“DOD”), also produced an Arctic plan, and the DOD is
U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 77, at 8.
Id. at 15.
101 Id.
99

100

102

Id. at 17.
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also a party to the Interagency Committee. 103 The Navy’s
perspective on the Arctic is different from the Commission’s
because the Navy’s objectives are focused on maritime defense and
security. The Navy’s strategic plan includes a long-term impact
assessment of the environmental challenges in the Arctic region, the
increased commercial and human activity in the Arctic and its
geopolitical landscape. While the Navy’s objectives in the Arctic
differ from the objectives of the Commission, the Navy would also
benefit from icebreaking capabilities and enhanced port
infrastructure to service its maritime activity in the Arctic.
The Navy’s mandated objectives in the Arctic are, in part, to
“[e]nsure United States Arctic sovereignty and provide homeland
defense; [p]rovide ready naval forces to respond to crisis [sic] and
contingencies; [p]reserve freedom of the seas; and [p]romote
partnerships within the United States Government and with
international allies and partners.”104
However, as a result of “retreat[ing] . . . sea ice[,]” new
challenges, such as increased navigability and use by both Arctic
and non-Arctic nations because of the “abundant resources and trade
routes,”105 impede efforts to satisfy the Navy’s objectives.106 The
Navy’s objectives include:
a global responsibility to protect vital sea lanes and operating
areas, including defending the Nation’s maritime borders
and [Exclusive Economic Zones]. The geostrategic
importance of the Bering Strait will increase as resource
extraction, shipping, fishing, and tourism increases. The
Navy will be forward deployed and prepared to protect
United States’ maritime access and interests as the Arctic
Ocean sea lanes begin to open.107

15 U.S.C.S. § 4106(b)(2)(A)-(L) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-243).
NAVY TASK FORCE CLIMATE CHANCE, U.S. NAVY ARCTIC
ROADMAP 2014-2030, 3 (2014).
105 Id. at 3.
106 Id. at 3. (see comment above)
107 Id. at 17.
103
104
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According to the Navy, the Arctic Ocean’s overall
navigability is effected when more entities, whether public or
private, utilize shorter shipping lanes to exploit or extract resources.
As a result, there is more pressure on the Navy. Moreover, the
extraction and exploitation of “oil and gas development, fishing,
tourism, and mineral mining could alter the region’s strategic
importance as Arctic and non-Arctic nations make investments.”108
This competition could be a divisive factor in international relations.
The Navy, which has global responsibility to peaceably facilitate
this interaction, especially when it affects U.S. territory, will need
to enhance operations to protect and secure U.S. territory.109
Other challenges to the Navy’s objectives include the sheer
size of the Arctic region, which “covers an area of about 5.4 million
square miles, almost 1.5 times the size of the United States.” 110 This
geographic challenge requires enhanced monitoring, enforcement,
and preparation. There is also the challenge posed by “a harsh
climate . . . and little infrastructure[,]” all of which inhibits the
Navy’s ability to operate successfully in the Arctic region. 111
While the Navy is not specifically referenced in the Act, its
connection to the Arctic region is clear, and the policy and research
carried out by the Navy was specifically considered in the
Interagency Plan.112 The Navy, while not acting pursuant to the Act,
is nonetheless influential in contributing to research and policy in
the Arctic. Furthermore, the Navy’s conduct in the Arctic “[t]hrough
ongoing exercises, such as Ice Exercise . . . and Scientific Ice
Expeditions . . . research, and transits through the region” 113
coincides with the conduct carried out by other U.S. agencies acting
in direct accordance with the Act. The Navy’s ability to meet its
objectives is challenged by the increased commercial activity, which
ultimately affects international relations. Similar to the research

Id. at 3.
Id. at 17.
110 Id. at 6.
111 Id. at 3.
112 INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, supra note 62, at 15.
113 Navy Task Force Climate Change, supra note 16, at 18.
108
109
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conducted by the Commission, the Navy’s research and policy
indicates that icebreaking vessels and improved arctic infrastructure
are necessary for the Navy to meet its ongoing objectives and protect
U.S. interests in the Arctic.
3.

Department of Defense (“DOD”) Arctic Plan

The DOD’s operations extend to the Arctic Ocean not only
because they are a member of the Interagency Committee, 114 but
also because, like the Navy, the DOD, through its agents, is tasked
with defending and securing the U.S. A significant challenge the
DOD faces due to the changing Arctic icescape includes
maintaining “[a]dequate domain awareness[,]” which is an essential
component of protecting maritime commerce, critical infrastructure,
and key resources.”115 Due to the ongoing and rapid changes in
maritime commerce, which is spurred by reduced ice coverage,
providing enhanced security and defense have become challenged
by the “broad spectrum of activities, ranging from resource
extraction and trade to activities supporting safe commercial and
scientific operations to national defense.”116 The DOD’s mission to
defend and secure is complicated by an expanding region due to ice
melt and expanded human activity that is accompanying commercial
opportunities. While the DOD is taking a fiscally conservative
approach in its Arctic Plan, in terms of restraint towards new
infrastructure development117 and premature investment in new
technologies,118 the challenges that DOD identified could
nonetheless be alleviated by new infrastructure and icebreaking
vessels, despite the cost.
The physical presence of icebreakers and infrastructure in
the Arctic, while perhaps not identified as critical to accomplish the
15 U.S.C.S. § 4106(b)(2)(A)-(L) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-243).
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ARCTIC STRATEGY, 9 (2013).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 10 (“solutions for associated supporting infrastructure requirements
should seek to leverage existing U.S. Government, commercial, and
international facilities to the maximum extent possible in order to mitigate the
high cost and extended timelines associated with the development of Arctic
infrastructure.”).
118 Id. at 12.
114
115
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DOD’s security objectives, would certainly ease their ability to do
so, would also reduce reliance on foreign countries who have greater
Arctic capabilities;119 and would also further the objectives
described in the Act. As the Arctic changes, and invariably new
challenges confront the U.S., the pressure on DOD to meet its own
objectives, while also assisting other U.S. agencies, will increase.
Although DOD’s objectives in the Arctic region differ from the
goals described in the Interagency plan, there is a long-term mutual
benefit that can be realized if the Plan’s goals are fulfilled because
it will enhance and stabilize U.S. interest in the Arctic, which can
ease pressure on the DOD.
4.

U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategy

Although the Coast Guard is not specifically mentioned in
the Act, it is represented in the U.S. Interagency Plan through the
Department of Homeland Security,120 which subsumes the U.S.
Coast Guard.121 While the Coast Guard’s objectives are similar to
those of the DOD, and the U.S. Navy, they also differ. The Coast
Guard’s statutorily defined objectives include “search and rescue
operations, securing the maritime border, collecting critical
intelligence, responding to potential disasters and protecting the
marine environment.”122 The Coast Guard, similar to DOD and the
U.S. Navy, anticipates a variety of challenges to its ability to carry
out its objectives due to the Arctic Ocean’s reduced ice coverage. 123
The Coast Guard’s Arctic Plan offers a thorough analysis of the
many challenges it faces because of increased commercial activity.
Moreover, the Coast Guard offers the most compelling evidence in
Id. at 10 (“Security cooperation activities and other military-to-military forms
of engagement establish, shape, and maintain international relations and the
partnerships necessary to meet security challenges and reduce the potential for
friction.”).
120 INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, supra note 62, at v.
121 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 10, at 1.
122 THE UNITED STATES COASTGUARD, ARCTIC STRATEGY, 9 (2013).
123 Id. at 34 (“[O]il and gas, shipping, fishing, mining, logging, adventure
tourism, and renewable energy . . . [are] increasing human activity in the Arctic.
As these activities increase there will be a corresponding demand for the Coast
Guard to exercise all of its mission sets in the region.”).
119
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support of icebreaker procurement and port development in the
Arctic. The Coast Guard’s emphatic call for investment and vessel
rehabilitation perhaps lies in the fact that the current heavy
icebreaking fleet is owned and operated by the Coast Guard itself. 124
Arctic research and policy is dependent on functioning icebreakers
and infrastructure.125 The Coast Guard’s pivotal role in the Arctic
makes it a critical organization whose own ability to fulfill their
objectives causes a significant effect to the objectives of the Act.
The Coast Guard identified multiple driving factors that
impact its ability to carry out its objectives. The first challenge
comes in the form of “trans-shipment of cargo through the Arctic
region[,]” which has already increased. 126 Increased shipping in the
coming years due to reduced ice density allows for longer periods
of time in which commercial shipping through the Arctic is
viable.127 Longer thawing periods and warmer temperatures equate
to “[e]conomic development, in the forms of resource extraction,
adventure tourism, and trans-Arctic shipping.”128 The global
commercial investment in the Arctic region, specifically Chukchi
and Beaufort Sea, totaled $3.7 billion since 2005. 129 With more
investment and infrastructure, the more maritime activity there will
be.130 The Coast Guard must adapt to meet new challenges within
the Arctic region in order to carry out its objectives among the
multitude of other players.
Increased maritime activity will also affect the safe passage
of commercial vessels. In regard to ensuring safe maritime passage
in the Arctic, the Coast Guard is particularly concerned with the
risks to ships and their crews because of “[e]xtensive distances,
extreme weather, and scarcity of physical infrastructure [which]
present logistical challenges [that] . . . accentuate the challenges of
routine operations or response to major contingencies in the
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 68, at 1.
THE UNITED STATES COASTGUARD, supra note 121, at 35.
126 Id. at 7.
127 Id. at 9.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 13.
130 Id. at 17.
124
125
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Arctic.”131 The lack of infrastructure in the Arctic, and the
increasing human activity from commercial shipping creates more
safety risks, and generates concern surrounding the ability to carry
out search and rescue operations in the region, thereby potentially
jeopardizing human lives.132
The Coast Guard is also tasked with ensuring safety and
cleanliness in the Arctic environment. “Expanding maritime
activities in the Arctic require increased presence, oversight,
regulatory enforcement, and contingency response.” 133 Regulations
must be enforced, and the Coast Guard must be equipped with
resources to clean-up after, what is almost inevitable, environmental
disasters. This is critical in the Arctic region because “more than 50
percent of America’s fish stock comes from the Nation’s Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) off [the coast] of Alaska.” 134 Pollution in the
Arctic has the potential to cripple a significant U.S. economy.
Pollution or harm to the environment is not limited to oil spills but
can also arise because of “efforts to discover and exploit offshore oil
and gas reserves.”135
Preserving the environment for its own sake is important, but
it is doubly so when there is a significant economy attached to its
health. “The Bering Sea remains home to one of the world’s richest
biomasses and is currently the only sustainable fishery in U.S. Arctic
waters . . . If fish stocks begin to migrate north, commercial fishing
interest will surely follow, which could lead to increased foreign
incursions into the U.S. EEZ in the Arctic Ocean .”136 The Coast
Guard is tasked with difficult objectives, and the harsh conditions
create more challenges that make it difficult for the Coast Guard to
be effective, if not given the appropriate resources. The Coast
Guard’s identification of these challenges indicates that there are
also likely to be areas where further research and policy
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14, 20.
133 Id. at 21.
134 Id. at 7.
135 Id. at 22 (“[T]he energy industry will deploy oil rigs, offshore supply vessels,
barges, and tankers in Arctic waters” all of which has hazardous risks to
environmental safety.).
136 Id. at 28.
131
132
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development will be necessary until they are no longer considered
challenges.
Another challenge that arises from the changing
environment and commercialization of the region is the issue of
enforcement of international or multilateral treaties and agreements
that govern conduct in the Arctic. This challenge is exacerbated by
the “number of non-Arctic nations and non-state organizations [that
plan to] . . . engage in Arctic maritime activity.”137 As more private
and public organizations utilize the Arctic Ocean for their own
purposes the more of a strain on, but need for, diplomatic relations
in the Arctic Ocean. The Coast Guard, as a law enforcement entity
with a physical presence in the Arctic Ocean will play a significant
role when it comes to enforcing international treaties and
agreements.
Some of the important international treaties, declarations,
and organizations that the U.S. abides by, which are enforced by the
Coast Guard, include United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (“UNCLOS”),138 The Illulissat Declaration, 139 The Ottawa
Declaration of 1996 (which established the Arctic Council), 140 and
the International Maritime Organization. 141 With respect to
Id. at 17.
Id. at 14 (“The United States is not a party to [UNCLOS] but accepts and acts
in accordance with the provisions of the Convention relating to traditional uses
of the oceans – such as navigation and overflight – as reflective of customary
international law and practice.”).
139 Id. at 14 (The Illulissat Declaration states in part: “‘the law of the sea
provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the
outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment,
including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research,
and other uses of the sea.’ Also, signatory nations remain committed to this legal
framework and see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal
regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”).
140 Id. at 14 (“The Ottawa Declaration of 1996 established the Arctic Council as
a high-level, consensus-based intergovernmental forum for cooperation in the
Arctic. While not a governing body, the Arctic Council provides the primary
institutional framework for international Arctic issues.”).
141 Id. at 14-15
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a United Nations
specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of
shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. All Arctic
137
138

192

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

maritime governance, the Coast Guard has vital responsibilities to
maintain international governance and represent U.S. interest in
shaping maritime governance and policy in the Arctic region, all of
which will affect the U.S. and its ability to capitalize on the Arctic
economy.
Challenges to Arctic policy development is influenced by
international cooperation. The Coast Guard must have the ability to
contribute to international efforts in order to contribute to Arctic
policy. Now, “[l]imited operational resources and expanding
maritime risks underline the need for increasing collaboration in the
region.”142 The Coast Guard must have the ability to maintain U.S.’s
commitments to maritime governance as laid out in and by the
treaties and governing organizations. To maintain mutually
beneficial relationships that are “essential for mission success” In
the Arctic economy.143 Mutually beneficial international
collaboration is exemplified by the Coast Guard’s ability to
“[l]everag[e] international information-sharing arrangements.”144
The Coast Guard’s Arctic strategy for the coming years
involves an effort to make-up for shortfalls, which include, among
other things “the need for additional icebreakers and long-range
patrol vessels. . . [as well as] infrastructure investments. 145 These
resources are critical to the Coast Guard’s success in the Arctic
because they afford the Coast Guard an opportunity to effectively
satisfy the long-term objectives in the Arctic, which has an ancillary
impact on research and policy initiatives. As the Act so highlighted,
U.S. interest in the Arctic was to have a long-term view on
sustainable practices, the Coast Guard has identified adequate
vessels and infrastructure as key resources that allow the Coast
Guard to navigate the huge territory and carry-out its missions
effectively over the course of the current and distant future.
States are members of the IMO. In 2009, the IMO agreed to develop a
mandatory Polar Code that would offer construction, operating, and
environmental guidelines for shipping through polar waters.
142 Id. at 22.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 24.
145 Id. at 36.
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Congress should approve funding for vessels and infrastructure
because “[e]ffective maritime presence is essential to improving
awareness and ensuring safe, secure, and environmentally
responsible maritime activity in Arctic waters . . . Presence also
enable adequate enforcement of vessel routing regimes and
compliance with safety, security, and environmental laws and
treaties.”146 Moreover, these resources will ensure continued future
success for U.S. agencies operating in the Arctic.
A.

Consequential Results of Inaction

The Arctic serves as a vital region to advance U.S. economic
and geopolitical interest. This was realized when the Act was first
considered, and, is in part, the reason for its enactment. The Arctic
economy is ripe for engagement, and the U.S. must act before other
world powers establish control and leave the U.S. in a position in
which it cannot benefit. While research and policy were necessary
and critical components to the U.S. interest in the Arctic region
when the Act was initially considered and enacted, the current
atmosphere is significantly different. If U.S. interest is to advance,
the U.S. must set-out new initiatives, which must include
icebreaking vessels and improved arctic infrastructure. These
resources can overcome the many challenges that are illustrated in
the Interagency Plan, as well as the additional individual Arctic
policy plans produced by the U.S. Arctic Commission, Navy, DOD,
and Coast Guard. Without additional icebreakers and improved
arctic infrastructure, Congress cedes U.S. interest in the Arctic
economy to the rest of the world because the U.S. agencies will
simply be unable to compete and fulfill their responsibilities
effectively.
IV. NEXT STEPS FOR ICEBREAKERS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Fortunately, the U.S. Congress is making the appropriate
steps to advance U.S. interest in the Arctic economy into the future
by appropriating spending money to the Department of Homeland

146

Id. at 26.
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Security and the Navy to begin the acquisition of three Heavy Polar
Icebreakers.147 Additionally, Senator Lisa Murkwoski sponsored a
Bill, entitled the Shipping and Environmental Arctic Leadership
Act, S. 3740, 115th Cong. (2017-2018), which proposes actionable
initiatives to develop sustainable infrastructure in the Arctic region.
The proposed Bill seeks to accommodate the increasing maritime
navigation in the Arctic region. 148 Senator Murkowski’s legislation
is also noteworthy because it is financially sustainable and uses
infrastructure to benefit the U.S. economy. 149 Although the Bill has
not gained the necessary support to advance through the Senate,
there is at least progression in acquiring three new heavy polar
icebreakers.
A.

Heavy Polar Icebreaker Acquisition

Although not mentioned in the Commission’s report, the
U.S.’s position in the world when it comes to an icebreaking fleet is
outranked by countries like Russia, Canada, Finland and Sweden.
The U.S. has eight icebreakers of varying classes, however, three of
those eight are only planned, another is entirely inoperable, yet still
counted, and another one is not owned by a U.S. agency, but a
private company that leases to the NSF. 150);151 Russia comes in first
with forty-six icebreaking vessels of varying size and capability
(eleven of which are under construction and four of which are
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600,
COAST GUARD ACUISITIONS POLAR ICEBREAKER PROGRAM NEEDS
TO ADDRESS RISKS BEOFRE COMMITTING RESOURCES (2018).
148 Shipping and Environmental Arctic Leadership Act, S. 3740, 115th Cong.
§2(4) (2017-2018) (“investment in infrastructure for shipping routes, ice breaker
service and refuge, ports, spill prevention and response, salvage, and LNG
[Liquefied Natural Gas] bunkering, would be collectively beneficial for all
associated states, the environment, and global commerce.”).
149 Id. at § 2(13). Shipping and Environmental Arctic Leadership Act, S. 3740,
115th Cong.
150 RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34391, COAST
GUARD POLAR ICEBREAKER PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS 6 (2018); see generally U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF
WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY, MAJOR ICEBREAKERS OF THE
WORLD (2017).
151 U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY, MAJOR
ICEBREAKERS OF THE WORLD (2017).
147
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planned);152 and ending in a six-way tie for last, are six countries
with one icebreaker of varying size. 153 The class size of an
icebreaker indicates the vessels ability to break through varying
degrees of dense ice. 154 When it comes to the current acquisition
process in the U.S., the three icebreakers are to be “heavy polar
icebreakers,”155 which afford navigating through the most dense ice.
Having this icebreaking capability is crucial to carrying out
U.S. interest in the Arctic region. The responsibilities of U.S. polar
icebreakers are immense. They are summarized here:
Conduct[] and support[] scientific research in the
Arctic and Antarctic; defending U.S. sovereignty in
the Arctic by helping to maintain a U.S. presence in
U.S. territorial waters in the region; defending other
U.S. interests in polar regions, including economic
interests in waters that are within the U.S. exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) north of Alaska; monitoring
sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the
United States; and conducting other typical Coast
Guard missions (such as search and rescue, law
enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in
Arctic waters, including U.S. territorial waters north
of Alaska.156
Congress was essentially forced to decide to either advance U.S.
interest in the Arctic or not. The decision to appropriate money from
the apparent challenges generate by increased commercial
Id.
Id.
154 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 68, at 57. Class
classification can vary in different countries because the class is based on a
regulatory scheme common to that country. See Id. The Polar Code recently
published by the IMO is an effort to bring some uniformity to this process when
it comes to maritime navigation in the Arctic. See generally IMO,
INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN POLAR WATERS
(POLAR CODE) (2017).
155 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, Supra note 7, at 1.
156 RONALD O’ROURKE, supra note 134, at 1-2.
152
153
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navigation in the Arctic, which will require some level of support
from U.S. icebreakers;157 as well as “the Coast Guard’s
[questionable] ability to ensure year-round access to the Arctic . . .
with the current fleet [which could negatively] . . . affect U.S.
economic, maritime, and national security interests in these
regions.”158
Due to the overall expected cost of the icebreaker program,
which includes the lifecycle of the three planned polar icebreakers,
the money could obviously not all be appropriated in one budget
cycle. The total lifecycle cost estimated by the Department of
Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and the Navy was $9.8 billion,
however, according to the Government Accountability Office, this
number may increase. 159 Since this acquisition process is so
expensive, “[t]he Coast Guard and the Navy established the IPO
[Integrated Program Office] to collaborate and develop a
management approach to acquire three HPIBs [Heavy Polar Ice
Breaker].”160 The IPO allows the Coast Guard and Navy, two federal
agencies that are likely to be most reliant on icebreakers because of
their duties, to combine funds to jointly purchase the icebreakers.
“The IPO has responsibility for managing and executing the HPIB’s
acquisition schedule, acquisition oversight reviews, budget and
communications, and interagency coordination.”161 The IPO is
spearheading the acquisition process using appropriations
earmarked for the icebreaker program, which was initiated by the
Id. at 2.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 1.
159 Id. at “GAO Highlights” Page.
160 Id. at 7.
161 Id.; see also RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34391, COAST GUARD POLAR ICEBREAKER PROGRAM:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 12 n.32 (2018).
These agreements [between the Navy and CG] state that the
program will follow DHS acquisition policies with DHS
leadership serving as the acquisition decision authority for
program milestones. However, the navy will review and
approve acquisition documents before the program seeks DHS
approval. These agreements also state that the program’s
contracting actions could be funded by either USCG or Navy
appropriations, and the source of the appropriations will award
the contract.
157
158
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Coast Guard in their FY2013 budget. 162 The Coast Guard was
subsequently “authorized to use incremental funding for the HPIB.
This authorization is reflected in the Coast Guard’s January 2018
affordability certification memo.”163
The acquisition process for the first heavy polar icebreaker
is currently underway. 164 “In March 2018, the Navy released the
solicitation for a contract to design and construct up to three HPIBs.
The Navy indicated that it anticipates awarding the contract in the
third quarter of fiscal year 2019 with $270 million in Navy funding
that Congress has appropriated for the program.” 165 In conjunction
with the Coast Guard’s FY2019 budget, 166 the goal is to have the
first heavy polar icebreaker “enter service in 2023.” 167 While this is
the first step, there are many variables that can impede this process
and increase the cost. 168 The ultimate goal, which “envisages the
acquisition of three new heavy polar icebreakers, to be followed
years from now by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar
icebreakers”169 is still in the distant undefined future.

RONALD O’ROURKE, supra note 134, at 11.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 47;
see also Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-120, § 207
(Feb. 8, 2016).
164 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 46
(“The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 authorized
procurement of one Coast Guard heavy polar icebreaker vessel.” See Pub. L. No.
115-91, § 122(a), (b).).
165 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 1;
See also Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Div. C,
Title III (Mar. 23, 2018); Consolidated Appropriations Act 2017, Pub. L. 11531, Div. C., Title III (May 5, 2017).
166 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 46
(The Coast Guard originally requested $30 million, but “[s]ubsequently, after
discretionary budget caps were relaxed by Congress, the Administration’s fiscal
year 2019 budget addendum requested an additional $720 million in fiscal year
2019 Coast Guard appropriations for the program.”).
167 RONALD O’ROURKE, supra note 134, at 11.
168 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra
note 7. (“unplanned changes to the [IPO’s] scope and any corresponding funding
requests for unanticipated cost growth would require discussions and
agreements with both Coast Guard and Navy leadership.” Id. at 49.).
169 RONALD O’ROURKE, supra note 134, at 11.
162
163
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V. CONCLUSION
There is undisputed evidence that global warming is
deleteriously effecting ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean. As a result
of this environmental cataclysm, the Arctic economy is expanding.
Natural resources that were once unavailable are now accessible,
and commercial shipping through the Arctic Ocean’s three main
routes is more viable and more cost effective than traditional
commercial maritime routes. Because the Arctic economy promises
economic advantages, the Arctic is seeing billions of dollars in
investment money. It is important that the U.S. contribute to the
Arctic economy, but currently, however, U.S. involvement is
limited.
The U.S. interest in the Arctic was codified in the Arctic
Research and Policy Act, which focused on long-term development
in the Arctic, with the intention of realizing an economic benefit
therein. The Act mandated continuous research and policy
initiatives through a network of federal agencies. That research and
policy culminates in a regularly produced plan that includes goals
that further advance U.S. interest in the Arctic. The degree in which
the Arctic environment has changed since the Act was implemented
is immense, and the opportunities presented by the Arctic economy
seem to be greater than what Congress originally envisioned. The
U.S. is now in a position where it cannot adequately compete with
other countries that are investing in the Arctic economy because
U.S. agencies are not equipped with the necessary resources. The
U.S. only has one fully operational heavy polar icebreaker and the
infrastructure in its Arctic territory is deficient. These resources will
continue to be stressed because of increasing human activity in the
Arctic, which is a result of the expanding Arctic economy. This
assertion is substantiated by data from both the Plan, and the four
federal agencies examined above. The human activity is a challenge
to maintaining effective and essential operations in the Arctic. There
is now an immediate need for icebreaking vessels and improved
infrastructure to not only support operations, but to reinvigorate
sustained U.S. interest in the Arctic region.
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Congress must act now if the U.S. is to compete with other
world powers such as China and Russia, which are expanding their
interests in the Arctic economy at a rapid pace. While acquisition of
the three heavy polar icebreakers is a crucial first-step, more must
be done. Congress should initiate the procurement of additional
icebreakers, and begin infrastructure improvement projects as
identified in Senator Murkowski’s proposed legislation. These steps
are necessary if the U.S. is to capture the original intent of the Act,
which is long-term, sustained, development for the purpose of
capturing economic benefits in the Arctic.
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Appendix
1.

https://e360.yale.edu/assets/site/ArcticShippingRoutes_TheArcticInstitute.jpg,
[https://perma.cc/47SC-MXFW].

